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This paper looks at the role of risk aversion in determining participation of agricultural 
farmers holding water rights in the water markets.  Risk aversion is of the non-expected 
utility maximizing type that allows for subjective weighing of the actual risks emanating 
from water transactions.  The analysis involves design of a theoretical model that 
involves bargaining over sharing of surpluses between the buyer and the seller of water.  
The seller of water incorporates the bargaining outcome in his inter-temporal expected 
benefit maximization problem that accounts for the possibility of loss of water rights due 
to its sale out of agriculture.  The analysis is also extended to more than one farmer case 
and explores the impact of time preferences and relative risk aversion between 
participants on outcome in the water market.  Results are predominantly derived through 
numerical simulations. Introduction 
 
  The rate of introduction of water markets in the USA, despite a growing disparity 
between its value in agriculture and urban use, has been low with success showing only 
in a few regions.  The several factors responsible for this low success rate have been 
classified into institutional and behavioral (Ranjan et al. 2003).  The institutional factors 
can be classified into political, legal, physical, and financial.  Political bottlenecks include 
disregard for economic efficiency driven policies such as efficient allocation and re-
definition of water rights to facilitate transfer of water to its higher valued uses (Gaffney 
1997).  Legal factors include the ambiguity over the definition of water rights that fails to 
account for third party impacts and promotes uncertainty over the future water rights for 
market participants (Colby 1990).  Physical and financial bottlenecks include the lack of 
transferring and storage facilities and financial instruments that help the participants 
hedge risks from water trade created by water supply and water rights driven 
uncertainties.  Behavioral factors involve the water owner’s response to the nature of 
risks associated with water transfers and its role in affecting water transactions (Goodman 
and Howe 1997). 
  The role of risks has been acknowledged as one of the most significant forces 
affecting the water markets.  Yet, few studies exist that have closely scrutinized this 
aspect of the water markets.  Further, in general, the traditional ways of dealing with risks 
have been found to be inadequate in explaining the behavioral responses of participants 
to risk (Starmer 2000).  For instance, the expected utility maximization theory fails to 
capture the fact that risk averse participants may show more aversion to losses than a 
desire for gains involving same payoffs. Loss of water rights resulting from trade in water is a real fear that the farmers face while considering the pros and cons of participating in 
the water markets.  This fear has been substantiated by the evolving nature of water rights 
that has been geared towards facilitating the provision of water to its most beneficial uses 
(Howitt 1995).  In selling his water out of agricultural uses, the farmer must weigh the 
benefits of current transfer to the costs of loosing the water rights in future.  An expected 
utility maximizing farmer would weigh the tradeoffs between the marginal value from the 
sale of current water and its marginal impact on prospects of future benefits from 
retaining the water rights.  However, if the farmer assigns higher weights to low risks of 
water rights loss and lower weights to high risks of loss, a phenomenon confirmed 
through several experiments in behavioral economics, he may display strikingly different 
behavior as compared to the one predicted by expected utility maximization theory (List 
2003).   
  In this paper we apply the insights from behavioral economics to understand the 
response of farmers who participate in the water markets.  This is achieved through a 
Nash bargaining framework wherein the buyer and the seller maximize the product of 
their surpluses.  The farmer while putting water for sale also considers the impact of his 
current sales on future risks of water rights loss. Several weighing schemes are used to 
consider the impact of his nature of risk aversion on water sales (Prelec 1998).   
Model 
 
  There are two participants in the water market, a farmer and an urban buyer.  The 
farmer runs the risk of losing his water rights over time if he decides to sell that water out 
of agricultural use.  The risk of loss may be a function of level of water transactions and 
some other exogenous parameters beyond the farmer’s control (for instance environmental needs, increasing water scarcity, redefinition of ‘beneficial  use’,  etc.).    
Let us assume that the amount of loss of water rights would be confined only to the 
amount of water transferred.   The amount of water used in agriculture may still be 
available to the farmer. 
  Farmer’s profits comprise the sale of water to the urban buyer and sale of 
agricultural output.  His objective is to maximize the expected profits over time under the 
constraint of continuously evolving risk from water trade.   The current and future urban 
water demand and the cost of obtaining water from an alternate source to the urban buyer 
are given and known to both.  A mathematical sketch of the model is presented below. 
 Let  xbe amount of water sold to the urban buyer by the farmer out of his total 
endowments of one unit, i.e.  1 0 < < x .  Let  be the transaction cost of selling that 
water.  Output in agriculture is a function of amount of water applied ( , and land 
( ) and is Cobb-Douglas in form.   
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where  ) , , ( θ x s p  is the instantaneous probability (or hazard rate) of loss of water 
rights at time s and is a function of the amount of water sold xand some exogenous 
parameterθ  beyond the farmer’s control.  Consequently  ) (t λ evolves as: 











When the farmer looses his water rights, his benefits are simply the output from 
agriculture given by (assuming agriculture prices are 1 for all periods): (3)  , which summed to infinity and discounted at 
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Until the time the farmer retains his water rights his profits in each period would be: 
(5)   
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where  x π is the profit to the farmer from selling his water to the urban buyer at a price π . 
Therefore the expected discounted sum of profits to the farmer from water trade and 
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The farmer’s problem is to maximize (6) subject to (2).  However, x is indirectly 
determined through bargaining between the urban buyer and the farmer over the price of 
water.  Therefore, assuming a Nash bargaining game, the problem could be set up as: 
(7)    ) ( * ) ) ) 1 ( 1 ( ( x Bx l x x Max π π
β α
π − − − −
where the first bracket represents the farmer’s surplus from trade and the second term 
represents the urban buyer’s surplus from avoiding a costly alternative source of water B. 
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  This form of bargaining assumes that the total amount of water x to be sold to the 
urban buyer is decided in advance by the farmer through his objective maximization.  
The bargaining is only over the settlement of the price of water.  Plugging (8) back into 
(6) we get: (9)  ∫
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The current value Hamiltonian can be written as: 
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Taking the first order condition with respect to x yields: 
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In steady state equation (12) reduces to: 
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In equation (14) the left hand side represents the change in the instantaneous value 
function from an incremental sale of water to the urban buyer.  This includes changes in 
the bargaining profits and the changes in future agricultural returns from loss of water 
rights.  The right hand side of the above equation is the discounted sum of all future 
benefits from the current instantaneous expected returns brought in by the effect of an 
increased hazard rate from the sale of incremental water.   
  More insights could be drawn from a numerical simulation of the above model 
through a hypothetical set of parameters.  We now turn to role of subjective weights on 
the probabilities of loss of water rights in determining the farmer’s supply of water to the 
urban buyer.  These weights will be placed on the hazard rate , which is the 
probability of the loss of water right at time t, given that it did not happen before.  Let the 
weighing function follow an inverse S-shape as is generally agreed upon in the literature.  
This captures the relatively high weight that farmers may put on low chances of losses 
and low weight on high chances of losses.  Following Prelec (1998) we use: 
) (x p
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The actual path of the hazard rate which is determined by the optimal allocation problem 
may now look different from before.  Intuitively, when the hazard rate is high, farmers 
may have the incentive to reduce it by selling less water.  However, with a subjective 
weighing that discounts high risks, they would not care about loss any more and put more water on the table.  Similarly, when the initial hazard rate is low, they would have placed 
more water on the table in absence of subjective weighing.  However, with subjective 
weighing they may not.  In this analysis the inflexion point of the inverted s-shaped curve 
is critical and can only be determined empirically.  There is no theoretical basis for 
weighing the hazard rates either (as compared to weighing instantaneous probability).  
Weighing of hazard rates implies that the predominance is given to the probability of the 
rights being lost at time t, given that they would survive until that time.  In an exponential 
distribution, this hazard rate is constant.  Whereas, when weightage is put solely on the 
instantaneous probability, which for an exponential distribution is given by , it 
is inevitable that future probabilities would be lower, therefore introducing a bias towards 
higher sale in future due to the reduced risks.   
) ( ) (
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Details of the Numerical Simulation 
The instantaneous hazard rate  p has been defined as: 
   
2
0 ) ( ) ( t x p x p =
Transaction cost  has been ignored for now to understand the basic issues first.  The 
parameters used in numerical simulation are presented below in Table 1. 
) (x c
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Numerical simulations were preformed using GAMS.  A time horizon of 200 years 
mimics the infinite horizon problem and the steady state is found to exist.  The results of 
the simulations are presented in the figures below.   
  Figure 1 depicts the comparison between a no-risk case and a constant risk case. 
When there are no risks the optimum response of the farmers is to put most all of his 
water for sale, reflecting the lower returns in agriculture.  In a constant risk case, the response is to sell a lower amount of water for a certain period of time and no water 
afterwards.  Risk of water right loss lowers the incentives to sell water and raises the 
incentives to use it in agriculture.   
Next we look at the behavioral responses of the farmers.  This is done through 
five cases depicted in Table 2.  Besides, the base case is the one involving unweighted 
risks.  Case A, as shown in figure 2, puts the least weights on the hazard rates below the 
inflexion point.   Case B has higher weightage compared to case A implying its higher 
risk aversion for low values of hazard rate.  Also, note that the weights beyond the 
inflexion point are higher too for case B than A, implying B’s risk aversion is lower than 
that of A once the hazard rate crosses a certain threshold.  Case C monotonically assigns 
higher weights to all hazard rates as compared to cases A and B.  The pattern of water 
sales is shown in figure 3.  The base case leads to low water sales all throughout until the 
end when they are spiked
1.   
  In case A, the perceived risk is higher compared to the base case. This leads to a 
higher sale of water all throughout as future benefits are discounted at a larger rate.  In 
case B, the subjective risks lead to still larger perceptions of a high hazard rate compared 
to case A) thus, pushing water sales to later stages.  In the initial periods all the water is 
dedicated towards agricultural production as the future gains in terms of avoided water 
rights loss outweigh the instantaneous benefits from water sales.  However, as future 
benefits are also discounted, the optimal time to start allocating some water for outside of 
agricultural uses is decided by the point where the expected benefits from allocating 
water jointly between agricultural and non-agricultural uses equals the sure profits from 
allocating all the water to agriculture.  As the subjective weights are raised still higher in 
                                                 
1 The spike in water sales at the end is due to the end of time horizon effect. Case C, it leads to an interesting discontinuity in the pattern of water sales.  While high 
risk makes it optimum to postpone current sales until the future risk of water loss is 
mitigated by the high discount factor, it is feasible to sell some water in the beginning 
stages and still keep the risk low
2.   One can interpret this discontinuity as being 
introduced by the non-linear nature of the weighing function.  The point of inflexion may 
play a crucial role in deciding whether the optimal policy should be to risk a low amount 
of water for all periods through water sales or risk a higher amount but only in the later 
stages.  This tradeoff favors a sale of low water for all periods in the base case and case A 
and a high amount of water in later stage in cases B and C.  The weighing becomes even 
more stronger in cases D and E, where very high weights are placed on lower risks with 
the point of inflexion pushed beyond the planners scope of risks.  These  weights are 
depicted in figure 4.  The effect on water sales is shown in figure 5.  Note that high risks 
make it suboptimal to postpone water sales as future gains are highly discounted.  This 
prompts the sale of high levels of water in the early stages.  Note that in figure 5, water 
sale is higher in the relatively lower risk case D and lower in the higher risk case E.  This 
may seem counter intuitive at first, but also note that as the expected profits from water 
sale fall due to high discounting, the profits from its use in agriculture rise.  As a 
consequence, even though more water is sold in case E compared to cases A, B and C, it 
does not exceed that of case D.   
Proposition 1:  An inverted S-shaped weighing of the hazard rate has a similar effect as 
the discounting of resources facing risk of loss. The increase in risk perception of water 
rights loss leads to an increase in water sales.  However, when the weights are relatively 
low (low risk aversion), an increase in marginal weights on the hazard rate leads to a 
                                                 
2 This break in water sales response presents interesting venues to analyze for policy purposes.    higher sale of water for all time periods (compare Case A and Base Case).  When weights 
are relatively large, a marginal increase in weights leads to reduced sale of water (Cases 
D and E).  There is an intermediate set of weights which leads to discontinuity in water 
sales that ranges from water sale being relegated to later stages to water sale occurring 
only towards the beginning and the end.   
  So far we have looked at the impact of high subjective weights on lower levels of 
hazard rate.  However, due to the nature of weighing scheme used, it is also possible that 
farmers switch their roles when risks become relatively large.  Note that an inverted S-
shaped weighing function is uniform, when the farmer who assigns higher weights to 
lower risks also assigns lower weights to the higher risks, i.e., becomes less risk averse at 
high levels of risks.  Alternatively, the uniformly inverted s-shaped weighing allows 
wider fluctuations in either direction allowing the higher risk averse farmer to turn into a 
lower risk averse farmer beyond the inflexion point.  It is possible that when time 
preferences are altered  so that farmers heavily discount the future, they would be 
operating in the realms of high risks.  In such a case the more risk averse farmer of the 
previous case may also become the less risk averse farmer under a higher discounting.  
This intuition is tested through further simulations wherein we raise the discount rates to 
10 percent.  Figure 6 compares the water sales for cases A and B in the two discount rate 
cases of 1 percent and 10 percent.  Observe that when the discount rate is low, Case B is 
the more risk averse guy (assigns higher weights to lower risks) thus selling water only in 
the final stages.  Case A is the low risk averse guy, who sells less water but consistently 
all throughout.  This is consistent with proposition 1 that says, below a threshold level of 
hazard rates higher risk farmer would sell more water.  However, as the level of discounting is raised to 10 percent, Case B becomes the less risk averse person and Case 
A is the more risk averse person.    This is evident from the weighing scheme of figure 2.   
As a consequence, following proposition 1, Case A sells less water than Case B.  Figure 7 
compares their hazard rates.   
Proposition 2:  Under an inverted S-shaped weighing of risks, risk aversion of farmers is 
significantly affected by their time preferences.  Farmers who are less risk averse at low 
levels of discount rate turn more risk averse at high levels of discount rate and vice versa.  
As a consequence, risk aversion alone may not be sufficient in predicting water sale 
behavior.  For instance, a farmer who places high weights on his risks but also has a low 
discount rate may behave the same way as the one who places lower weights on risks but 
also has a higher discount rate.   
  Next we look at the roles played by transaction costs and external factors that 
affect the risk of water rights loss.  The instantaneous hazard rate  p is now defined as: 
    ) 05 . exp( ) ( ) (
2
0 t t x p x p − =
The exponential element in the hazard rate reflects the effect of exogenous factors that 
reduce the risks over time.  This is only one of the several possibilities that exist with 
respect to exogenous effects.  For instance risk might as well be increasing over time.  
Transaction cost  has been defined as:  ) (x c
    ∫ − =
t
dt t x t x x c
0
) ) ( 02 . exp( ) ( ) ( δ
A simulation of the base case is shown in figure 8.  Note that, the reduction in 
transactions costs and the hazard rates over time make it possible to attain a much higher level of steady state water sales.  However, as mentioned before such interpretations are 
subject to the assumptions over the nature of future costs and risks.   
 
Two Farmers Case 
 
  The above analysis was restricted to a single farmer case.  In reality, water sale 
decisions in a given geographical region are interlinked, as one farmer’s decision to sell 
water may affect the supply of water to the downstream users.  In such cases, despite well 
defined water allocations, risks to water rights may be interdependent.  Such risks are 
further reinforced in presence of third party impacts.  Joint sale of water may affect water 
risks in both directions.  For instance, when water sellers are able to exercise clout over 
political processes relating to future water rights decisions, the larger their group, the 
stronger will the rewards from coalition formation.  Since, in most cases federal 
incentives too are geared towards promoting markets, such effects are likely to be 
stronger.  However, when uncertainties are large, farmers may choose to err on the low 
side and act as if the more water that is sold, the larger are the risks of loss of water 
rights.  In such cases joint sale of water must incorporate the ensuing risks and therefore, 
a mechanism must be designed to share profits from water sales.  In cases where water 
markets exist, farmers often form cooperatives to share profits.  Though, a manger is in 
charge of running the operations of such profits, his economic decisions are 
predominantly guided by the way voting rights are shared amongst participants.  In case 
each participant has equal voting right irrespective of his endowments, the managers 
incentives may be to maximize joint profits.  In cases when voting rights are weighed by participants’ endowments, manager’s goal would be maximize the weighted profits.  We 
apply a cooperative decision making process to the bargaining game presented previously 
in order to explore joint water sale decisions in presence of risks. 
  Consider two farmers, I and II, with farmer one having twice as much water as 
farmer two.  Specifically, farmer I has two units of water he could use for agricultural 
purposes or sell to the buyer and farmer II has one unit of water which he could allocate 
similarly.  The allocation decision is made in the following fashion.    The manager of the 
cooperative owned by these two farmers maximizes the weighted sum of their profits 
over an infinite horizon.  The weighing is either equal-weighing wherein both farmers 
receive equal profits or it is weighed by their water endowments in which case farmers I 
gets 66 percent weighing and farmer II gets 33 percent.  During the bargaining phase with 
the buyer, the weighted surplus from water sales is maximized in order to derive the price 
of water
3.  More specifically, the bargaining stage involves: 
{ } { } ( ) )) ( ) ( ( * ) ) ) 1 ( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ) ) 1 ( 1 ( 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 x x x x B l x x w l x x w Max + − + − − − − + − − − π π π




{ } { }
) ) 1 ( ( 2




w l x l x w B
− +
− − − + − −
+ =
β α β α
π  
This relationship between price and water sales is fed back into the weighed profit 
maximization problem of the manager similar to equation (9) before.  We consider three 
specific cases to study the impact of risk aversion on water sales in a cooperative game.  
These cases are depicted through figures 10-12.  Figure 9 shows a situation in which both 
                                                 
3 This is a very simple bargaining game.  Another game could be one in which the product of the individual 
farmer’s surpluses is maximized.  Such a game would however complicate the analysis in second stage of 
the game when farmers decide upon a mechanism to allocate water sales over the infinite horizon 
considering its impact on risks.   the farmers have low risk aversion to water loss.  Farmer I being the more endowed one 
in this case gets to sell more water than farmer II.  In fact, when the weighing is water 
ownership based (with farmer I getting 66 percent of weights), farmer II bears most of the 
weights of risk avoidance.  That is, his water sales are minimal.  Farmer II’s sales 
improve in the equal weighing scenario, whereas those of farmer I fall marginally.  One 
can conclude from above that when risks are low and farmers differentially endowed, the 
less endowed farmer bears a higher share of such risks under either weighing scheme.   
Notice that the farmer with less water also has a lower opportunity cost of water in terms 
of forgone agricultural output. As a consequence, increase in water sale from farmer II 
may not raise the weighted profits (for the manager maximizing their joint weighted 
profits) as much as they would add to the risks of water rights loss.  The implication of 
water-weighted profits allocation is then to reduce the supply of water in the market.  
Equal weighing increases total water supply only marginally as the water sale of farmer I 
falls under this scheme.  The second case, that of high risks, as shown in figure 10, 
reveals that water sales of farmer I increase marginally from the previous case, whereas 
those of farmer II  rise significantly under water-weighted profit sharing.  Total supply of 
water in the market in this case, however, is higher compared to the low risks case as 
current benefits from higher water sales exceed the opportunity costs of water rights.  
This scenario shows that as the risks increase, the less endowed farmer suffers less 
disproportionately.   This is primarily due to the fact that weighted profits of farmer II 
from increased sale of water are higher than the reduction in benefits from increased 
risks.   Finally, in figure 11, farmer I is also the one with relatively higher risks.  Under 
water weighed profits sharing he still manages to sell more water, with farmer II bearing the burden of reducing risks.  However under an equal sharing of water, total water sales 
fall.  This is due to the fact that high risks of farmer I are discounted as compared to the 
water-weighted case.  As a consequence, sales from farmer I decrease and from II 
increase.   
Proposition:  The amount of water sold in the water market would depend upon the 
relative risk aversion of the participants and the nature of profit sharing scheme between 
the farmers.  A farmer with a lower endowment of water may end up bearing a higher 
burden of the risk of water right loss under an equal sharing scheme.   
  While the above analysis does not extend beyond a two farmers case, it is possible 
that with an increase in the size of the markets, the outcome with respect to relative water 
sale and consequently risk sharing amongst participants would resemble that of a 
competitive market.  Under such a situation it is possible for less endowed participants to 
make larger gains from water sale. 
 
Conclusion 
Little empirical evidence exists to test the validity of the inverted-S shaped 
weighing scheme in the water markets.  However, the above exercise throws valuable 
insights into the nature of water sale from water owners faced with the threat of loosing 
their water rights.  The analysis involves putting the risk from water sale in a dynamic 
infinite horizon context wherein the expected benefits from water sale are maximized for 
water sellers by a manger.  The manager may choose between an equal sharing or water 
endowment-weighted scheme to decide allocation water sales amongst its participants.  The price of water is determined through a bargaining scheme that maximizes the product 
of surpluses of the farmers and the water buyer.   
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 Table 1 
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Parameters  Case A  Case B  Case C  Case D  Case E 
γ   .79  .6 .8 .05  .05 





































































Case B (gamma=.6, theta =.99)
Case A (gamma=.79,theta=.99)
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Time 
Case A (rho=.1) 
Case (b (rho=.1) 
Case A(rho=.01) 
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Time 
Case A (rho=.01) 
Case B (rho=.01) 
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years
farmer1--weighted sharing 
farmer 2--weighted sharing 
farmer1--equal sharing 





































1  11  21 31 41
farmer1--weighted sharing
farmer 2-- weighted sharing
farmer 1--equal sharing
farmer 2-- equal sharing
 














1  21  41  61  81 101 121 141 161 181 
farmer 1--weights=.66 
farmer 2--weights= .66 
farmer 1--weights= .5 
farmer 2--weights= .5 
  
 
(Gamma1=.025, Gamma2=.25, Theta1=Theta2=.45) 
 